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Serenity and harmony are hardly the hallmark of parent-local
union relationship. Material differences at times overflow the channels
of intraunion bounds and affect existing representative status and con-
tract rights. When dissension cuts sufficiently deep to bring about a
parting of the ways with resultant confusion in the identity of the or-
ganizations claiming to represent employees under a collective bargain-
ing agreement, there exists the legal situation which the National Labor
Relations Board [hereafter, the Board] calls a schism.'
The schism doctrine is a by-product of the Board's struggle to re-
solve the conflict, inherent in the National Labor Relations Act,2 be-
tween the desirability of stability in labor-management relations and
securing to employees their free choice of representatives. Aside from
the provision of having no more than one election a year,3 the statute
does not by specific provision attempt to resolve this conflict. The
Board has done so by the case-by-case method.4
Early in the history of the act, the Board barred an election peti-
tion if a contract for the duration of one year existed between the em-
ployer and the incumbent union.5 The Board then moved to a more
flexible position, saying that a contract for a "reasonable period of
time" will bar an election.6 What was "reasonable" depended upon the
duration of contracts in "a substantial part of the industry" involved.7
* Member, New York Bar.
1 Naumoff, "Evolution of the NLRB Contract Bar Doctrine," 10 CCH Lab. L. J.
687, 691 (Oct. 1959).
2 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
168 (1958).
3 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1958).
4 See Milis and Brown, From The Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 155 (1950). In
Trailer Co. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1109-10 (1943), the Board said:
"The Board has always held to the view, we think correctly, that its discretion with
respect to the effect to be given to a collective bargaining contract in a representation
case is limited by the necessity of balancing two separate interests of employees and
society which the Act was cearly designed to foster and protect: namely, the interest
in such stability as is essential to encourage 'the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining' and the sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of employees to select
and change their representatives at will. In weighing these conflicting interests, the
Board has developed its doctrine that a contract will bar an investigation to determine
representatives for a definite and reasonable period, but no longer."
5 National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939).
6 See 6 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 55 (1941); Eaton Mfg. Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 53 (1941).
7 See 10 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 19 (1945); Uxbridge Worsted Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 1395
(1945); United States Finishing Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 575 (1945).
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In more recent times, the Board has enunciated a more rigid rule:
We have decided that henceforth a valid contract having a
fixed term or duration shall constitute a bar for as much of its term
as does not exceed 2 years and that any contract having a fixed term
in excess of 2 years shall be treated, for the purposes of contract
bar, as a contract for a fixed term of 2 years, notwithstanding the
fact that a substantial part of the industry of which the contract
employer is a part may be covered by contracts for a longer term.8
During the evolution of the contract bar principle, the Board,
which started by giving weight to stability of labor relations, began to
think in terms of the "status" of the incumbent union and of protecting
that status.9 Of course, if a situation existed where "status" was lost
and where the contract could not serve to stabilize labor relations, the
Board realized that more weight ought to be given to the freedom of
choice of representatives. In such situations, the existing contract was
held not to bar an election."°
It is clear that if the union, which signed a contract with the em-
ployer, was no longer in existence or was no longer functioning, it had
no status to be protected and there was no longer any stability of labor
relations to preserve. The contract, therefore, lost its purpose as a
bar."
A "schism" in the ranks of the union, leading to a doubt as to who
represented the employees, also prevented an existing contract from
being a bar to an election petition.'" In a very early case, United Stove
Co., the Board said:
The Board notes that this case does not involve a contest be-
tween rival labor organizations competing for majority representa-
tion during the existence of a valid outstanding exclusive bargaining
contract, but that substantially the entire membership of Local 630,
A.F.L.-U.A.W., acting upon their own initiative, disbanded the local,
surrendered its charter, and transferred their affiliation to the
C.I.O.-U.A.W. Under all the circumstances of this case, we find that
the contract does not constitute a bar to this proceeding.13
In that case, the incumbent local was a part of the AFL United
Automobile Workers. While its contract with the employer was in
effect, the local's executive board appointed a committee to submit to
the local membership a resolution to change affiliation to the CIO Auto-
mobile Workers Union. At a membership meeting, called for that pur-
S Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp and Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 992 (1958).
9 See Millis & Brown, op. cit. supra note 4, at 157.
10 Container Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945); Trailer Co. of America, supra note 4.
11 Aladdin Indus., 63 N.L.R.B. 76 (1945).
12 United Stove Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 305 (1941).
13 Supra note 12, at 308.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
pose, the members who attended voted unanimously to assign the in-
terests of the AFL local to a new CIO local. They disbanded the AFL
local. They reconvened immediately as a meeting of the CIO local and
elected the same officers they had when they were the AFL local. The
company refused to recognize the new local. The CIO local petitioned
for an election. The company and the AFL local set up their contract
as a bar. The Board ordered an election. The AFL local evinced no
desire to be on the ballot. "No union" appeared on the ballot.
In the United Stove case, there was no confusion as to which union
represented the employees. A direction of election, however, was the
method by which the employer could ultimately be forced to bargain
with the CIO local.
A mere change in affiliation is not enough to create a schism and to
remove a contract as a bar. This was stressed by the Board in Michi-
gan Bell Telephone Co.14 There, the Communications Workers of
America, a parent organization, was unaffiliated. The union had sub-
ordinate groups, known as divisions. Divisions 43 and 44 had agree-
ments with the employer. During the period of these agreements, the
parent union affiliated with the CIO. The employer filed an election
petition, claiming that the affiliation had so changed the character of
the contracting divisions as to create a doubt that they remained the
chosen representatives of the employees.
The Board dismissed the employer's petition. It noted that, as an
exception to its contract bar principle, it had directed elections "in
cases in which a change in the structure or affiliation of the contracting
union so modified the character of that union that a real doubt arose as
to whether it remained the labor organization which the employees de-
sired to represent them."' 5 The Board then went on to say that the
exception did not apply in that case:
In all of the cases relied upon by the Employer something
considerably more substantial than a mere change in the affiliation
of the contracting union's parent organization, such as is present
here, had occurred. Thus, in many of these cases, the facts dis-
closed a schism in the contracting union, resulting in the establish-
ment of a new union which challenged the representative status
of the existing local. In others of these cases, the old contracting
union abandoned its representative status or was voted out of exis-
tence by its members. It is true that in some instances the schism
in, or demise of, the contracting union was provoked by a change
in the affiliation of that union or of its parent organization. But we
are aware of no case in which the Board applied the rule here
14 85 N.L.R.B. 303 (1949).
'5 Id. at 304.
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urged by the Employer where a change in affiliation of the parent
union, without more, was all that occurred. 6
There were, of course, no conflicting claims to representation
rights in the Michigan Bell case. There was merely an attempt by an
employer to repudiate a relationship because it preferred not to deal
with a union which abandoned its independent status to become part of
the CIO. The stability of labor relations, in a legal sense, represented
by the collective bargaining agreement and an unopposed union to ad-
minister it, continued to exist. The basic reason for maintaining the
agreement as a bar to an election was present. Thus, in Louisville
Ry. Co.17 and Prudential Ins. Co.,' where locals disaffiliated from
one parent, affiliated with another, kept their identity and assigned
their agreements with the employers to the locals as newly affil-
iated, there was held to be no schism and the employers' petitions for
elections were dismissed.
It is, of course, a question of fact in each case whether or not a
"change in the structure or affiliation of the contracting union so modi-
fied the character of that union"' 9 that confusion arises as to the
identity of the union. The Board has endeavored during the years to
establish criteria by which to measure whether a true schism exists,
whether to conclude that there is no longer any stability of relations
to maintain and, therefore, to resolve opposing representation claims
by an election despite the existence of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
In 1958, the Board endeavored to standardize its criteria in
Hershey Chocolate Corp." While the earlier schism cases arose out of
the transfer of allegiance from the AFL to the CIO and then out of
expulsion of parent unions from the CIO on ideological grounds, the
Hershey case arose out of the expulsion of a parent union from the
AFL-CIO as a result of disclosures by the McClellan Committee.
In Hershey, the employer filed the election petition. Local 464 of
the Bakery & Confectionary Workers International Union of America
(BCW) had represented the empl oyer's employees since 1939. The
BCW was originally an AFL affiliate. It later was an affiliate of the
merged AFL-CIO. Its most recent contract with Hershey ran from
April 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958. The local negotiated, executed
and administered the contract. While the contract was in effect, BCW
was first suspended and then expelled from the AFL-CIO as a result
16 Id. at 304-05.
17 90 N.L.R.B. 678 (1950).
18 106 N.L.R.B. 237 (1953).
19 Supra note 15.
20 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958).
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of corrupt practices brought to light by the McClellan Committee. The
suspension caused a rift in the ranks of BCW. Local 464 held a mem-
bership meeting, called for the purpose of voting on a resolution con-
demning the BCW officers and calling upon BCW to meet the condi-
tions imposed by the AFL-CIO.
When BCW was expelled, the AFL-CIO chartered a new union,
the American Bakery & Confectionary Workers of America (ABC).
Then Local 464, by a majority executive board vote, called a special
membership meeting to consider disaffiliating from BCW, and affili-
ating with ABC by transferring assets and the status of the collective
bargaining agreement with Hershey to the latter. The membership, by
a vote of 829 to 1, agreed to disaffiliate from BCW, to affiliate with
ABC as Local 464, to transfer property and contract rights from Local
464 BCW to Local 464 ABC and to retain the same officers as the of-
ficers of the new local. ABC then chartered the new local. After the
new affiliation, about 1,350 employees out of 1,700, who formerly had
dues deduction cards with BCW, executed new dues deduction cards
in favor of Local 464 ABC. The Board, after reviewing these facts,
stated that "the change in affiliation has apparently produced no
change in the bargaining relationship with the employer.1121
The employer filed a petition because it did not know which of
the two organizations it was obligated to recognize. Both unions
claimed the contract as a bar. No more than 50 employees expressed
any continued allegiance to the old BCW.
It would seem, at this point, that the Board could have dismissed
the petition on the basis of the Louisville Ry.22 and Prudential Ins.
cases.23 There seems to be little doubt that here there was a transfer
of affiliation with complete maintenance of identity and substantial
employee participation and acquiescence in the transfer. The Board
itself recognized that there was "apparently .. .no change in the
bargaining relationship with the Employer. ' 24
However, the Board took the occasion offered by this case to con-
sider "possible revisions in certain of its contract bar policies bearing
on or related to the issues of schism .... I25 The Board decided to
wrestle with the many problems flowing out of schism situations. It
considered, not only what would constitute a schism, but: the type of
election to hold where a schism exists, the effect of such an election on
21 Id. at 904.
22 Supra note 17.
23 Supra note 18.
24 Hershey Chocolate Corp., supra note 20, at 904.
25 Id. at 905.
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the existing contract and the consequences of assigning the contract
from one union to another.
It is interesting to note that, at the very outset, the Board re-
iterated its earlier position that its contract bar policies are discre-
tionary rules "which may be applied .or waived as the facts in a given
case may require in the interests of effectuating the policies of the
Act.""' It would seem, therefore, that although the Board may develop
principles regarding a schism (as it did in Hershey), one may never be
certain that these principles will always be applied in the same way.
The Board, in discussing the elements of a schism, pointed out
that in the past it had held a schism existed in (a) cases where a basic
intraunion conflict resulted from disaffiliation or expulsion of a union
from a federation and the creation of a new rival union within the.
federation or the transfer of affiliation of part of one union to an ex-
isting rival union, 7 and (b) cases where local change of affiliation was
unrelated to any basic intraunion conflict.2 The Board concluded that
it would continue to find a schism in the first type of case, that is,
where local action occurs in the context of a basic intraunion conflict,
but that it would no longer hold that a schism existed in the second
type of case.
Thus, the Board would no longer hold a schism existed, as it held
in Brightwater29 (where the independent contracting union purported
to affiliate with District 50 UMW, leaving a group of employees who
were still loyal to the independent union and kept its identity alive),
or in Sun Shipbuilding30 (where 150 out of 2500 members of the con-
tracting union met and voted to disaffiliate from the parent union and
remain as an unaffiliated union and both the old and new unions
claimed representation rights), or in New York Shipbuilding' (where
700 out of 3000 members of the contracting union met and voted to
disaffiliate from one parent union and to affiliate with a rival parent
union).
The Board, in Hershey, stated that local union change resulting
26 Ibid.
27 Here, the Board cited The Great A.&P. Tea Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 656 (1958); A.C.
Lawrence Leather Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 546 (1954); Wade Mfg. Corp., 100 N.L.R.B. 1135
(1952); Boston Machine Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59 (1950); Harbison-Walker Re-
fractories Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 816 (1942); Brewster Aeronautical Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 1024
(1939).
28 Here, the Board cited N.Y. Shipbuilding Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 915 (1950); Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 86 NLRB 20 (1949); Brightwater Paper Co., 54 N.L.R.B.
1102 (1944).
29 Brightwater Paper Co., supra note 28.
30 Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., supra note 28.
31 N.Y. Shipbuilding Corp., supra note 28.
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from a basic intraunion conflict affected stability of labor relations
while a local union change unrelated to such a basic intraunion con-
flict did not affect stability of labor relations. The Board went on to
define "a basic intraunion conflict" as "any conflict over policy at the
highest level of an international union, whether or not it is affiliated
with a federation, or within a federation, which results in a disruption
of existing intraunion relationships." 2
Moving from definition to example, the Board described a basic
intraunion conflict as-
(a) disaffiliation or expulsion of an international union from
the federation with which it was affiliated, combined with the crea-
tion by the federation of a new organization with similar jurisdiction
or the assignment of such jurisdiction to an existing organization;
(b) a split within an international union in which some of its
officials transferred their affiliation to an existing rival union or
established a new organization claiming similar jurisdiction.33
The Board then moved from the specific to the general in its
description and concluded that it would find the existence of a basic
intraunton conflict in "any realignment affecting an international union
or federation of unions, resulting from a policy conflict, which has sub-
stantially the same effect on the stability of bargaining relationships
as the above illustrations.
3 4
The basic intraunion conflict, however, is not enough in itself to
constitute a schism. It must work its way down to the employees in
the bargaining unit. They must be stirred into action as a result of it
and such action must give rise to such confusion in the bargaining
relationship that only an election can restore the pre-existing stability.
It is apparent, then, that a dispute between a local and its parent,
causing the local to disaffiliate or to align itself with another parent is
not sufficient to bring about a schism situation. The conflict must be
at the top-the split must appear at the parent union level; only when
its reverberations have been felt and acted upon by the local at the
bargaining unit level, mirroring the split at the top and creating con-
fusion as to which entity represents the employees in the bargaining
unit, is there a true schism, leading to an election despite the existence
of a contract. The action at the local level must follow the split occur-
ring at the parent union level "within a reasonable period of time."3
The elements of a schism, said the Board, existed in Hershey:
there was the "basic intraunion conflict" at the parent union level
32 Hershey Chocolate Corp., supra note 20, at 907.
33 Ibid.




brought about by the expulsion of the parent union from the AFL-CIO
and the chartering of a new parent by the federation; the conflict at the
top had its repercussions at the bargaining unit level; the local acted
upon the conflict within a reasonable time after it occurred by dis-
affiliating from the old parent and joining the new; the employer was
faced with conflicting claims of recognition status from the old and the
new entities.
There is a "Toynbee-like" march of events which the Hershey
case wove into the presently-operative schism principle: the "universal
state" beset by a "time of troubles," followed by an interregnum dur-
ing which there occurs a "volkerwanderung" marked by the opposing
forces of an "internal proletariat" and an "external proletariat."
It would seem, in Hershey, that the substantial nature of the
change at the local level removed any confusion. The substitution of
the new local for the old was sufficiently complete to have justified a
recognition by both the employer and the Board of the new local as the
proper representative and as the continuing party to the agreement.
This approach, however, was expressly rejected by the Board. Thus
in so far as the election itself was concerned, the Board adhered
to its established practice: intervenors could get on the ballot; "no
union" would also appear on the ballot. Here, too, there is an internal
inconsistency. If the only confusion is as to which local-the old or the
new-is the continuing representative of the employees, why should
the door be opened to a rival third union or to an obliteration of union
representation altogether? With the wide latitude afforded employers
to propagandize against any union representation at all, the schism
situation makes employers unexpected and happy beneficiaries.
What about the contract? True, it is no longer a bar to an election.
But, if a union won the election, would the employer be obligated to
bargain a new contract or could it insist upon the winning union being
forced, by law, to assume the existing agreement? The Board felt that
stability of labor relations would be fostered if it would not require
the winning union to assume the existing contract. Of course, it could
do so voluntarily. But suppose the employer saw this as a good op-
portunity to negotiate more advantageous terms. Could it refuse to
go along with the winning union's desire to assume the old contract?
Presumably, the same principle of stability of labor relations would
accord to the employer the same rights that are accorded to the winning
union.
Suppose "no union" wins. A contract had been negotiated for a
specified duration. May the employer disregard the wages and working
conditions in that agreement because the status of the other party, the
union, has been obliterated by law? After all, the contract is not only
1961]
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a bipartite document. It concerns, covers and affects employees who,
in many respects, are third party beneficiaries of the wages and working
conditions set forth in the agreement for a specified period of time.36
May such employees sue on the contract to enforce their rights there-
under in the absence of the union? Complex questions of this sort,
as yet unanswered, are bound to arise from the type of tri-partite docu-
ment represented by the collective bargaining agreement.
The Hershey case gives a rather doctrinaire and rigid definition
of a schism. There may often arise situations where confusion as to
representation status occurs at the bargaining unit level to a degree
more marked than in Hershey, but where this confusion did not
emanate from a "time of troubles" besetting the parent union. And,
conversely, as in Hershey itself, the change at the local level may be so
clear, definite and complete as to cause little confusion and yet be
termed "schism," merely because it emanates from a basic intra-
union conflict at the parent union level. A fundamental reason for the
Board's approach seems to have been a desire to keep raiding, rival,
unions from asserting "schism" because of some success in converting
a number of local members or officers.
Hershey does serve the purpose of enunciating a principle and a
procedure with sufficient clarity to avoid confusion in the application
of the schism doctrine. It highlights the type of intraunion conflict
that can jeopardize existing representation status and contract rights.
36 See Cox, "Rights Under A Labor Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 604 (1955).
